Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554

RECEIVED

SEP 27 2001

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

In the Matter of		OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Petition of WorldCom, Inc. Pursuant		
to Section 252(e)(5) of the		
Communications Act for Expedited)		
Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the	CC Docket No. 00-218	
Virginia State Corporation Commission)		
Regarding Interconnection Disputes)		
with Verizon Virginia Inc., and for		
Expedited Arbitration)		
,		
In the Matter of)	CC Docket No. 00-249	
Petition of Cox Virginia Telecom, Inc., etc)		
)		
In the Matter of)		
Petition of AT&T Communications of)		
Virginia Inc., etc)	CC Docket No. 00-249	
)		

VERIZON VA'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ON MEDIATION ISSUES (CATEGORIES I AND III THROUGH VII)

PRICING TERMS AND CONDITIONS

- CHRISTOS T. ANTONIOU
- MICHAEL A. DALY
- STEVEN J. PITTERLE

SEPTEMBER 5, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Pa</u> :	<u>ge</u>
1	I.	INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW	1
	II.	INTERPLAY OF TARIFFS AND INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS (Issue Nos. III-18, IV-30, IV-32, IV-36, IV-85 and VII-23 through VII-25)	1
4 5			

1		I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
2	Q.	ARE YOU THE SAME PANEL THAT OFFERED DIRECT AND
3		REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ON NON-MEDIATION ISSUES AND DIRECT
4		TESTIMONY ON THE MEDIATION PRICING TERMS AND
5		CONDITIONS ISSUES?
6	A.	Yes. The education and background of the Pricing Terms and Conditions Panel
7		members were described both in the Direct Testimony on non-mediation Pricing
8		Terms and Conditions issues and the Direct Testimony on Pricing Terms and
9		Conditions mediation issues.
10		
11	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN THIS
12		PROCEEDING?
13	A.	This rebuttal testimony responds to testimony relating to the potential interplay
14		between the interconnection agreement and any tariffs that Verizon VA may file
15		with the Virginia Commission in the future (Issue Nos. III-18, IV-30, IV-32, IV-
16		36, and VII-23 through VII-25).
17		
18 19	II.	INTERPLAY OF TARIFFS AND INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS (Issue Nos. III-18, IV-30, IV-32, IV-36, IV-85 and VII-23 through VII-25)
20	Q.	WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF AT&T'S AND WORLDCOM'S REFUSAL
21		TO RECOGNIZE THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL EFFECT OF A TARIFF
22		EITHER APPROVED OR EFFECTIVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
23		APPLICABLE LAW?

Although AT&T and WorldCom claim that they need to achieve some measure of certainty through their interconnection agreements, what they really attempt to preserve is an arbitrage opportunity. AT&T and WorldCom hope to preserve a "best of both worlds" arrangement so that they can always choose the more favorable rates or terms of (i) their interconnection agreement or (ii) the applicable tariff on a case by case basis. While AT&T and WorldCom attempt to lock Verizon VA into rates and terms that for, a variety of reasons, should be updated in accordance with applicable law, they would not likewise be bound by the same contractual rates (i.e., under their logic, they could choose lower contract rates for a service even though higher rates have been approved or otherwise allowed to become legally effective by the appropriate commission, while at the same time they could purchase another service -- at rates lower than those set in the contract -- via rates that have been approved or otherwise allowed to become legally effective by the appropriate commission). Verizon VA's proposal ensures that all carriers -- including but not limited to AT&T, WorldCom, and Verizon VA -- receive services at rates, terms, and conditions that are fair and nondiscriminatory.

18

19

20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Α.

Q. ARE AT&T'S AND WORLDCOM'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE TARIFF FILING PROCESS JUSTIFIED?

21 A. They are not. First of all, Verizon VA only infrequently files proposed
22 collocation tariff revisions, and does not have a resale tariff, or an interconnection
23 or UNE tariff. In the few states where a Verizon company has resale,

interconnection, or UNE tariffs, Verizon again only infrequently files proposed tariff changes -- to give effect to a change in law or to introduce new service or offering, etc. Thus, CLECs do not have many tariff filings to review and, as such, there is no undue administrative burden on them to review these filings (i.e., they do not need to be the "tariff police"). And for the few tariff filings that Verizon VA may make, despite AT&T's and WorldCom's rhetoric, Verizon VA's tariff filings receive significant attention and scrutiny by the appropriate commission and by numerous and various CLECs, including WorldCom and AT&T. This is especially true if and when Verizon VA might seek to change applicable rates. WorldCom witnesses Trofimuk's and Harthun's concern that Verizon VA's tariff could become inconsistent with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act") is a red herring. A commission would either approve or allow a tariff filing to go into effect under the standards of applicable law, including the applicable provisions of the Act. There is absolutely no basis to assume that a commission would approve a tariff in violation of the Act. The bottom line is that if Verizon VA's tariff is approved or allowed to go into effect pursuant to applicable law, then it should be "effective" for all carriers on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. It is AT&T and WorldCom that should not be allowed to avoid changes in applicable law that they do not like. In addition, and consistent with the New York Public Service Commission's recent order in the AT&T/Verizon NY, Inc. arbitration (cited in the Panel's Direct Testimony), a state commission, as a general rule, should not have to expend precious resources relitigating on a contract by contract basis, issues that it already has decided in a global proceeding. To the extent that

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

l		a CLEC wishes Verizon VA to change the terms of a commission-approved and
2		legally effective tariff, but Verizon VA does not agree to the subject change, the
3		CLEC is always free to file a complaint challenging the tariff or its application.
4		
5	Q	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
6 7	A.	Yes, it does.

1	Declaration of Christos T. Antoniou
2	I declare under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing testimony and
3	confirmed that it is true and correct.
4	
5	Executed this 5 th day of September, 2001.
6	
7	
8	//ss//Christos T. Antoniou
9	Christos T. Antoniou
10	

Declaration of Michael A. Daly

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing panel testimony and that those sections as to which I testified are true and correct.

Executed this 5th day of September, 2001.

//ss//Michael A. Daly

Michael A. Daly

Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554

RECEIVED

SEP 27 2001 In the Matter of PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMERCIAL Petition of WorldCom, Inc. Pursuant **GFRICE OF THE SECRETARY** to Section 252(e)(5) of the Communications Act for Expedited CC Docket No. 00-218 Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation Commission Regarding Interconnection Disputes with Verizon Virginia Inc., and for **Expedited Arbitration** In the Matter of CC Docket No. 00-249 Petition of Cox Virginia Telecom, Inc., etc. In the Matter of CC Docket No. 00-251 Petition of AT&T Communications of Virginia Inc., etc.

VERIZON VA'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ON MEDIATION ISSUES (CATEGORIES I AND III THROUGH VII)

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

- CHRISTOS T. ANTONIOU
- MICHAEL A. DALY
- STEVEN J. PITTERLE

SEPTEMBER 5, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
I.	INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW	1
II.	ALTERNATE BILLED CALLS (Issue VI-1(Y)) and INFORMATION SERVICES TRAFFIC (Issue VI-1(AA))	,

i		I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
2	Q.	ARE YOU THE SAME PANEL THAT OFFERED DIRECT TESTIMONY
3		ON THE MEDIATION MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES?
4	A.	Yes. The education and background of the Miscellaneous Panel members were
5		described in the Direct Testimony on mediation miscellaneous issues.
6 7	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN THIS
8		PROCEEDING?
9	A.	This rebuttal testimony addresses two miscellaneous mediation issues:
10		• Issue VI-1(Y)Alternate Billed Calls
11		• Issue VI-1(AA)Information Services Traffic
12		On each of these issues, we respond to the testimony of WorldCom witness
13		Argenbright relating to these issues.
14		
15	Q.	THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES. HOW
16		ARE THE REST BEING HANDLED?
17	A.	We are addressing Issue V-15Sales of Exchanges in our General Terms and
18		Conditions testimony in conjunction with Issue VII-17Transfer of Telephone
19		Operations. The remaining miscellaneous issuesVII-23, VII-24, and VII-25are
20		being addressed by the Pricing Terms and Conditions Panel.
21		
22 23		II. ALTERNATE BILLED CALLS (Issue VI-1(Y)) and INFORMATION SERVICES TRAFFIC (Issue VI-1(AA))
24	Q.	WHAT IS THE MAIN DISPUTE BETWEEN VERIZON VA AND
25		WORLDCOM WITH RESPECT TO BOTH THE ALTERNATE BILLED

CALLS (VI-1(Y)) AND INFORMATION SERVICES TRAFFIC (VI-1(AA))

ISSUES?

Α.

The main dispute between Verizon VA and WorldCom in both instances appears to relate to the question of which carrier must bear the financial risk that the appropriate charges to the WorldCom local end-user will be uncollected. In this circumstance (i.e. in which WorldCom has the relationship with the end-user rather than Verizon VA), it is appropriate for WorldCom to bear the financial risk of the uncollectable charges incurred by WorldCom's end-user. The whole premise of WorldCom's argument that Verizon should be in the middle of a relationship between WorldCom's end-user and another provider is its false assumption that Verizon has voluntarily contracted with other providers. This is not necessarily the case.

A.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY IT IS NOT FAIR TO REQUIRE VERIZON VA TO CONTINUE TO BEAR THE RISK OF UNCOLLECTABLE REVENUE FROM A WORLDCOM END-USER?

As explained in this Panel's Direct Testimony, the extent to which this is an issue will vary from state to state depending on the services offered or allowed in that state. Nevertheless, to the extent that a Verizon company has performed a billing and collection function for third party providers, it usually has done so as a result of terms required by a state commission in a Verizon company's tariff. Although WorldCom witness Argenbright, page 45, complains that it would not be proper or fair for Verizon to "force WorldCom to guarantee that the end-users will render

payment," it is less proper or fair to expect Verizon to guaranty payments by WorldCom's end users when it no longer has the relationship with the end-user. Generally, to balance the risk of the uncollectable charges, state commissions provide the manner and means by which the service provider can terminate or block services to end-users. The requirements to terminate or block services to end-users are not yet tailored to an environment in which a variety of competitors may serve the end-user. The lack of this appropriately tailored remedy, coupled with the fact that Verizon no longer has any relationship with the end-user, leaves Verizon left with inadequate protections against a WorldCom end-user who may choose to use the line it purchases from WorldCom to access the services of third parties. Because Verizon did not voluntarily undertake a billing and collection arrangement with all third parties and because WorldCom has the ability to structure its relationship with the end-user to protect against that end-user's failure to pay charges arising out of the end-user's use of the line, it is WorldCom that should bear this risk and not Verizon.

A.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSE TO WORLDCOM'S TESTIMONY SUGGESTING THAT CERTAIN TRAFFIC BE EXEMPTED FROM RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION OBLIGATIONS?

No. WorldCom seems to interject a new issue when it discusses the reciprocal compensation scheme for what it calls "oddball codes." Moreover, this Panel does not address reciprocal compensation obligations. Rather, such an issue is more appropriately addressed by the Intercarrier Compensation Panel, which

1	generally has discussed the appropriate reciprocal compensation obligations in
2	light of the Commission's ISP Remand Order as well as WorldCom's suggestion
3	that NPA-NXXs should be used to determine the applicable compensation
4	scheme.
5	

6 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

7 A. Yes.

8

ì	Declaration of Christos T. Antoniou
2	I declare under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing panel testimony and
3	that those sections as to which I testified are true and correct.
4	
5 6	Executed this 5 th day of September, 2001.
7	
8	//ss//Christos T. Antoniou
9	Christos T. Antoniou
10	

1	Declaration of Michael A. Daly
2	I declare under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing panel testimony and
3	that those sections as to which I testified are true and correct.
4	
5 6	Executed this 5 th day of September, 2001.
7 8	//ss//Michael A. Daly
9 10	Michael A. Daly

1	Declaration of Steven J. Pitterle
2	I declare under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing panel testimony and
3	that those sections as to which I testified are true and correct.
4	
5	Executed this 5 th day of September, 2001.
6	
7	
8	//ss//Steven J. Pitterle
9	Steven J. Pitterle
10	